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FROM CLUB TO MARKET: THE EVOLVING
ROLE OF BUSINESS LAWYERS
Geoffrey Miller*
INTRODUCTION
The Enron fiasco, along with other major corporate frauds and scandals
of the past few years-WorldCom, Adelphia, Global Crossing, and
HealthSouth come to mind--dramatically illustrates a longstanding issue
about the role of business lawyers. To what extent can (or should)
attorneys act as the "conscience" of their clients and guide them away from
decisions that, while perhaps legally defensible, nevertheless raise questions
about their propriety? In theory, the answer to this question has long been
clear-cut. The American Bar Association's ("ABA's") Model Code of
Professional Conduct enshrined the goal of representing a client "zealously"
while remaining within the "bounds of the law" as one of the basic canons
of lawyers' ethics.1 How to carry out that obligation has been reasonably
well understood at a more operational level as well. For example, the
following propositions appear to enjoy consensus as descriptions of the
attorney's professional responsibility (although some would advocate
reforms to alter this basic pattern):2
1. The attorney's responsibility is to provide the client, on request, with
information about the probable legal consequences of potential actions,
and to do so with a reasonable degree of professional competence.
2. Unless the parties agree otherwise, the attorney is not responsible for
advising the client as to business (as opposed to legal) considerations.
3. If requested by the client, the attorney can recommend legally
appropriate means for structuring transactions in order to serve the
client's legitimate objectives (which can include minimizing regulatory
burdens, reducing taxes, or enhancing the client's public image).
* Stuyvesant Comfort Professor of Law, New York University Law School. Many of the
ideas in this paper were developed in conversations and joint work with Professor William
Allen, to whom I express grateful thanks. I also thank Stephen Gillers for helpful comments.
1. Model Code of Prof 1 Responsibility Canon 7 (1980).
2. See, e.g., William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101 Harv. L. Rev.
1083 (1988) (recommending that, in representing clients, attorneys exercise discretion to
promote justice, even when doing so is in tension with the client's wishes or interests).
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4. An attorney may assist a client in carrying out a course of action that
skirts the edge of the permissible, so long as the attorney believes in
good faith that the action is, in fact, legally valid and that the client has
adequate awareness of the legal risks.
5. An attorney may not counsel or advise a client to commit fraud or
otherwise act illegally, and may not assist the client in perpetuating a
fraud or other violation of law.
6. When the client is an institution (such as a corporation), the attorney's
obligations run to the institution as a whole, as embodied in its board of
directors, and not to its senior managers in their personal capacities.
In general the principles listed above provide a framework that has proven
relatively durable over time, and that-so far at least-has withstood the
firestorm of criticism generated by Enron and similar scandals. Even the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), which, post-Enron, suffered
withering criticism for alleged regulatory laxness, has retreated from using
"noisy withdrawal" provisions 3 to insert the attorney into a complex, quasi-
adversarial role towards any client the attorney believes has violated federal
securities laws. It is probable that, when the dust of the current scandals
settles, business lawyers' ethical obligations will not be radically different
from what they were before. This does not mean that constructive reforms
cannot be devised to correct shortcomings in the regulatory system. But
before such reforms are implemented, it is important that we understand the
problem and the dynamic forces that may have contributed to bringing it
about.
This paper attempts to shed some light on why the gatekeeper function-
that is, the role of independent attorneys in protecting the public against
corporate malfeasance-seems to have broken down in several recent cases.
The cause was not a sudden degeneration in the personal morality of
business lawyers. Instead, the problems that have come to light over the
past few years-to the extent that they are exceptional in light of historical
experience-are the product of large-scale economic developments that
profoundly influenced the environment within which these lawyers
practiced. The paper focuses on two developments: (1) a far-reaching
change in the economic organization of the legal profession from a "club"
system to a competitive one, and (2) the unusual macroeconomic
environment of the mid and late 1990s, exemplified by the stock market
bubble which peaked at the beginning of the current century. These
developments pressured attorneys to push the envelope of propriety when
requested to do so by their clients. In light of these pressures, what is
surprising is not that so many attorneys played a role in large-scale
corporate scandals, but that so few did so.
3. See infra Part IV.B. These provisions were proposed pursuant to the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 11, 15, 18, 28, 29 U.S.C.).
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Moving from descriptive to normative analysis, this paper asks whether,
in light of this economic analysis, the system regulating the activities of
attorneys and other gatekeepers should be revised to combat the risk of
inappropriate behavior. To the extent that the problems were due to the
stock market bubble and related economic conditions, reforms are
unnecessary because this unusual economic climate is unlikely to recur
anytime soon. Indeed, "reforms" may already have taken place in the form
of basic changes in the norms of legal practice. Additional actions could be
counterproductive if they impose too many constraints on the conduct of
attorneys in the absence of the economic conditions that generated the
problematic behaviors.
On the other hand, to the extent that the shift from club to competitive
organization in the legal services sector caused these problems, reform is
still needed, because the changes in organization are not a transient
phenomenon. This Essay does not recommend a return to the club system,
with all its coziness, exclusivity, and inefficiency. Like it or not,
professional service providers operate in a competitive environment and
will continue to do so. I do believe, however, that reforms might provide a
useful corrective to the risk of inappropriate behavior that the move to a
more competitive environment has created. The final section of this Essay
discusses several of these suggestions.
I. THE SOCIAL ROLE OF BUSINESS LAWYERS
Ronald Gilson's influential paper, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:
Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, outlines an optimistic theory of the role of
attorneys as transaction cost engineers.4 In this view, business attorneys
enhance the wealth of society as a whole when they serve the economic
interests of their clients. Lawyers accomplish this by identifying
arrangements that maximize the value of their clients' transactions. 5 For
example, suppose that in a contract for sale the question arises as to who
should bear the risk of loss between contract and closing. The traditional
understanding of a lawyer's role in this situation is that the attorney either
allowed the clients to negotiate the terms and merely embodied the
agreement in legal form-the "scrivener" function-or the attorney
negotiated for the client by attempting to win every deal point, thus often
ruining the whole transaction. Gilson argues, however, that when attorneys
negotiate a matter, they can perform a third, more valuable function: They
can help clients allocate the costs and benefits of a transaction to the party
who will make the best economic use of them, thus creating mutual benefits
for all parties to the agreement.6 The attorneys in the above example might
conclude, for example, that the seller's existing insurance policy can cover
4. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 Yale L.J. 239 (1984).
5. See id. at 249-56.
6. See id. at 255.
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the risk of loss most cheaply for all concerned, and thus agree to impose the
risk of loss on the seller with an appropriate adjustment of the sales price to
reflect this allocation.
Gilson's picture of the social value of business lawyers applies best to
negotiations between two parties with relatively equal bargaining power
and sophistication. The picture has less force, however, when these
conditions are relaxed. Two settings are especially problematic.
Negotiations with the Government. Suppose the transaction in question
is not between two individuals, but between one person and the public as a
whole. For example, in the absence of environmental regulation,
companies would be tempted to discharge pollutants into the air or water,
knowing that others will have to pay the cleanup costs. Attorneys who help
a company engage in such pollution (for example, by negotiating the
purchase of plant and equipment for the polluting facility) are not adding to
the welfare of society by minimizing transaction costs; instead, they are
reducing social welfare by taking advantage of the high transaction costs
that allow the factory to pollute in the first place. Gilson's transaction cost
engineer model of business lawyers has little relevance in this setting.
However, we do not simply allow businesses to pollute. We have
environmental laws and agencies to counteract their incentive to spoil the
environment in order to increase profits. Once laws and agencies with
enforcement powers enter the picture, Gilson's model has more force than
when the transaction is between corporate managers and a disorganized
group such as the public at large.
But Gilson's theory is still an unsatisfactory description of the behavior
of attorneys in this setting, even when legal regulation is included in the
model. The dynamics and underlying premises of action are different than
the one-on-one private bargaining for mutual advantage that forms the
centerpiece of Gilson's theory. Among the most salient differences are the
following.
First, while in a private bargaining situation everything is subject to
negotiation, in the context of legal compliance, the baseline of applicable
law is fixed in the short to medium term. The government agency is
required to enforce the law, even if the agency's personnel believe that the
requirement is unwise or impractical. If Congress tells the Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") that it must meet environmental goals by a
certain date, the EPA must attempt to achieve that objective even if doing
so imposes onerous burdens on the economy or creates collateral
environmental harms. Conversely, the government may be powerless
against parties whose conduct constitutes a clear breach of the spirit of a
law, so long as technical compliance is present. It is true that constructive
violations can be tracked down and punished (e.g., the step transaction and
business purpose rules in tax law),7 but these filters do not deter all socially
undesirable behaviors that are in technical compliance with the law.
7. See, e.g., Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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The incentives of government agents also differ in important respects
from those influencing private parties. Government agents may act as
effective representatives of their offices, but they typically do so for reasons
other than financial gain-pride in work or belief in the agency's mission
may substitute for a desire to accumulate wealth. It is clear that the
incentive structure for government agents is different than that of agents in
the private sector, and this difference may influence the dynamics and
outcomes of negotiations between private agents and the government.
A third difference between government enforcement and private
bargaining is that governments usually lack the resources to negotiate each
transaction individually. A great deal of enforcement is voluntary, in the
sense that citizens are asked to comply with the law without facing
particularized scrutiny of their performance. Only a small percentage of tax
returns get audited. The EPA does not have the ability to send inspectors to
every factory and job site to check emissions levels. In these and many
other settings, citizens can break the law with little fear of detection. On the
other hand, while the government's resources are stretched thinner, it does
have a more effective arsenal of enforcement techniques to punish
noncompliance. Private parties do not have the ability to impose fines on
defaulting counterparties-indeed, liquidated damages clauses will be
invalidated if found to constitute a penalty. Jail time is not a consequence
of a private party's breach, even when fraud is present.
Agency Costs of Management. The simple version of Gilson's model of
attorneys as transaction cost engineers also does not take account of the
agency cost problem within firms. Business lawyers typically do not
represent individuals in a formal sense. Most often, they represent
organizations, such as corporations, that have a fictional legal personality.
Yet they are hired by and must answer to human representatives of these
fictional persons. These representatives are not necessarily good agents of
the companies they serve. Like everyone else, corporate executives might
prefer to serve their own interests, including their desire to maximize their
own compensation at shareholder expense. Even if the attorney knows or
suspects that corporate officers are acting in a self-serving way, he or she
may elect to ignore this inconvenient fact. Because the basic executive
decisions-including the decisions to hire and fire counsel-are usually
made by corporate managers, the attorney will not necessarily abide by the
admonition that his or her duties run to the organization rather than its
officers. Because of this, if business lawyers respond atavistically to the
demands of corporate executives, they will not necessarily be serving the
best interests of their clients. On the contrary, they could exacerbate agency
problems, increase rather than decrease transactions costs, raise the firm's
cost of capital, and facilitate business decisions by the firm that are not
consonant with social welfare.
20051 1109
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These problems mean that business lawyers in compliance and fiduciary
duty settings may not maximize value for clients through transaction cost
engineering to the same degree as would lawyers in bilateral contract
negotiations between sophisticated parties. Lawyers representing private
clients in relations with the government or with corporate shareholders may
engage in any or all of the following types of behavior, only some of which
is socially beneficial.
1. The lawyer can find a way to conserve the client's resources while still
fully complying with the letter and spirit of an efficient law. In such
cases, the value creation function is similar to that which Gilson posits
for lawyers in the private sphere.
2. The lawyer can facilitate avoidance by the client of either the letter or
spirit of the law, but the law itself is economically inefficient. Here, the
lawyer has contributed (arguably) to value creation in Gilson's sense,
but does so at the cost of subverting other values (e.g., respect for and
compliance with laws) which we are likely to view as important.
3. The lawyer can facilitate avoidance by the client of either the letter or
spirit of the law, and the law is economically efficient. Here, the
lawyer's services have been used to advance the client's interests, but at
the expense of society as a whole. Even from an economic point of
view, the lawyer has engaged in value destruction rather than value
creation. Some of the behavior by attorneys in recent corporate
scandals may fall into this category.
4. The lawyer can serve the interests of corporate managers but does so in
a way that is detrimental to the long-range best interests of the
corporation. Here, again, the attorney has engaged in value destruction
rather than value creation. Some of the conduct by corporate attorneys
in recent corporate scandals also appears to fall into this category.
II. THE CHANGING CONDITIONS OF CORPORATE PRACTICE
The analysis so far suggests that attorneys representing corporate clients
in the contexts of corporate governance and legal compliance will not
always be subject to an effective check, and that, as a consequence, society
is at risk that the lawyer's services will be value-destroying rather than
value-creating. How should this risk be handled? A traditional answer is
that lawyer independence will substitute for the lack of private controls.
While the lawyer must be a faithful agent and zealous advocate, he is
always required to exercise independence of judgment and action. The
attorney's autonomy goes beyond merely recommending the best way to
achieve the client's goals. The attorney must also preserve a professional
distance from the client and eschew actions that cross over the line. To
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avoid even the "appearance of impropriety," 8 the attorney may remonstrate
with a client bent on questionable conduct, or, if the client persists, may
(and in some cases must) withdraw from the representation. 9 If all
attorneys actually exercised this degree of independence, the problems
identified above would be mitigated. A client who wanted to cross the line
would encounter an independent attorney obstinately blocking the path.
And although the client could dispense with that attorney, doing so would
be costly and any other qualified attorney would also refuse to sanction
client misconduct.
Lawyer independence, however, is effective at checking client
misconduct only if lawyers actually act independently. Underlying much of
the contemporary misgivings, both among lawyers and in popular
consciousness, is the concern that obligations of independence are too often
honored in the breach. Critics believe that, however loudly attorneys may
tout their independence, at the end of the day, money talks. Associated
with this cynical view of attorney ethics is the nostalgic view that the
problem of attorney venality is worse today than in times past. These
critics believe that, at one time, professional norms significantly impacted
lawyer behavior. However, today, such norms no longer protect against
attorneys who are all too willing to compromise their integrity in order to
curry favor with important clients.
To what extent is this perception justified? It is commonplace for
individuals, as they grow older, to bemoan a perceived breakdown in
standards. It is easy to forget that attorneys in the past have not always
been paragons of virtue. Recall, in recent history, the Operation Greylord
investigation in Chicago that disclosed massive corruption in the Cook
County, Illinois, court system, or the Watergate scandal in which many of
the villains were also members of the bar. Attorneys have been in bad odor
with the public for hundreds of years and have often been seen as
distressingly ready to sacrifice principle for avarice. But it is also possible
that social conditions have changed in a way that makes independent lawyer
behavior less likely today. This section explores that question.
A. From Club to Competition
If lawyers are less independent today than in the past, part of the reason
may lie in a fundamental change in the organization of the legal profession.
Gradually and fitfully, but unmistakably, the legal profession has shifted
from a "club" style of organization to one dominated by competitive
forces-a "free market" paradigm. As with any broad thesis about
economic history, this one requires qualification at the outset. "Club
organization" and "competitive organization" are not exclusive
characteristics. At any given time, the legal profession may display both
8. See Model Code of Prof'1 Responsibility Canon 9 (1980) ("A Lawyer Should Avoid
Even the Appearance of Professional Impropriety").
9. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16 (2002).
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club and competitive features. Competition was present in the bar even
when club organization was dominant, and many features of club
organization persist today even in an environment characterized by
competition among service providers.
The club form of professional organization displays the following general
features. First, the profession is exclusive, with significant barriers to entry
into membership. Second, members often maintain associations with one
another and with clients outside the context of their roles as professional
service providers. Third, competition among service providers, when it
occurs, is constrained by norms of politeness and courtesy. Fourth, there is
little lateral mobility within the profession; people join firms and remain
there absent unusual circumstances. Finally, relations between service
providers and clients tend to be stable and long-lasting and are based on
institutional history rather than the personal relationships of dominant
individuals.
Looking back to the legal profession circa 1950, it is easy to see features
of club organization. 10 Membership in the bar required graduation from
college and law school, passage of the bar examination, and approval by the
relevant committee on character and fitness. Family connections were often
a ticket into a good college, and graduation from a good college was a
significant factor improving chances for admission to a top law school. To
get set up in a firm, it paid to know someone who could introduce you, and
to obtain clients, it was desirable to have personal connections. Lawyers in
a community would be members of the same country clubs and civic
organizations as the business leaders, and they would socialize together in
all sorts of different settings. Almost all elite attorneys-and almost all
senior managers of corporate clients-were men of European
backgrounds. 11 Jews could and did practice law, but tended to do so in
firms characterized by ethnicity; "white shoe" firms had few Jews, no
women, and no African-Americans.
At the same time, competition among lawyers, while inevitably present,
was not emphasized as a professional value. On the contrary, it was
generally disapproved, at least as a guiding principle for action. Lawyers
who were too competitive would be stigmatized. Stealing another lawyer's
clients violated strong norms of professional courtesy, and any lawyer who
developed a reputation for poaching clients faced sanction from colleagues.
Solicitation or advertising of any sort was prohibited. In the case of
services to individuals and small firms, the constraints on competition were
even more overt. Many bar associations imposed "minimum fee
10. For sociological accounts and historical discussion of one important bar, see John P.
Heinz & Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar (1982);
John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago in 1975 and
1995, 32 Law & Soc'y Rev. 751 (1998).
11. See Richard L. Abel, American Lawyers 99 (1989). Even as late as 1989, a survey
of large law firms found that over ninety percent of the partners were men and more than
ninety-eight percent were white. Rita Henley Jensen, Minorities Didn't Share in Firm
Growth, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 19, 1990, at 1.
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schedules," which were nothing other than cartel prices backed by the threat
of penalties for undercutting the prescribed tariff.
The club style of organization was also characterized by limitations on
job mobility. An attorney who joined a large corporate firm would
generally expect-or at least hope-to spend his entire professional life
there. Movement by senior attorneys between firms was unexpected, even
remarkable, and, perhaps, a source of concern about that attorney's stability
or reliability. Junior attorneys who joined as associates would not be
assured of becoming partners, but the expectation was that, if someone
performed well, partnership would be the reward. Those deemed unworthy
of elevation were also protected. Someone passed over for partnership
could remain at the firm while seeking a new position, and could sometimes
swallow his pride and accept a role as a "permanent associate" doing blue-
sky or other work. Unsuccessful partner candidates would be out placed,
frequently into the offices of the in-house counsel of major clients.
Associated with this lack of mobility among attorneys was a stable
structure of attorney-client relationships. Major corporations would keep
one law firm as their outside counsel for years. The relationship between
the corporation and the law firm was cemented by personal bonds between
senior managers and partners. Those bonds were further reinforced over
time as junior executives and associate attorneys who came to know one
another in their subordinate capacities were promoted to positions of
authority. Sometimes, the law firm would take office space in the client's
headquarters. Senior lawyers from the firm might serve on the client's
board of directors. The firm would also frequently do the personal legal
work of the senior executives of major clients. Some attorney-client
relationships during this period were legendary: Shearman & Sterling, for
example, was strongly identified in the public eye as Citibank's outside
counsel.
The features of the club form of organization tend to be self-reinforcing.
Social connections among attorneys, and between attorneys and clients,
perpetuated exclusivity in the bar, while the profits guaranteed by such
exclusivity made pursuing such social connections a priority for any
ambitious attorney. Norms against advertising, solicitation and client
poaching gave durability to firms, because once a firm's reputation and
client base were established, other firms could not easily compete for these
benefits. Low lateral mobility of attorneys at elite firms tended to solidify
longstanding firm-client relationships, because attorneys would not leave
and take clients with them. At the same time, long-standing relationships
tended to discourage mobility, because no one attorney was likely to "own"
a major account. Outplacement of failed partnership candidates at
corporate counsel's office reinforced connections between firms and clients,
as did the concessionary provision of personal legal services. Barriers to
entry in the bar facilitated anticompetitive rules, such as minimum fee
schedules and norms against client poaching, while the presence of such
practices made barriers to entry valuable assets that attorneys wished to
2005] 1113
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maintain. Long-standing relationships between attorneys and clients also
tended to be self-reinforcing: The mere fact that a relationship had been in
place for so long enhanced its stability, since a breach of relations between
a firm and a client would raise serious questions about both and also be
painful to the individuals involved. These self-reinforcing qualities help
explain the club form's durability and far-reaching effects. 12
A comparison between the characteristics of elite legal representation in
the 1950s and the situation today illustrates a dramatic contrast in nearly all
of the elements identified above. The practice of law evolved from a club
form of organization to a competitive form. In consequence, law has
increasingly become a "buyer's market" in which clients call the shots. 13
Consider the barriers to entering the legal profession. It remains true
that, to gain admission to a bar, a candidate must graduate from college and
law school, pass the bar examination, and be approved by the character and
fitness committee. These constraints, however, are much easier to satisfy
than they were in the past. Law schools have proliferated and existing law
schools have increased enrollments, spewing tens of thousands of additional
attorney candidates into the bar admission system each year. 14 Character
and fitness review, never very significant except as a filter to screen out
undesirable characters such as communists and felons, has become little
more than a ritual of initiation in which the chance of failure is about as
high as that facing a bar mitzvah boy. The bar examination continues to
operate as a screen, but if a person is persistent, he is likely to pass
eventually, and, if he does not succeed in one state, he can always move
somewhere with a higher passage rate. Overall, barriers to entry into legal
practice have become less significant over time.
12. Although outside the scope of this Essay, other professions, and to some extent
industry generally, exhibited features of club organization during this time. For example, the
securities industry operated with fixed brokerage commissions until 1975. Real estate
brokers maintained fixed commissions as well. Professional organizations other than the
organized bar promoted norms of professional courtesy and discouraged advertising,
solicitation, and poaching. Even outside the professional service industries, the horror of
"ruinous competition" pervaded American industry. Cartels, price matching in oligopolistic
markets, and government restraints on price competition were common. Insurance operated
with explicit cartels until 1945, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Costly
Policies: State Regulation and Antitrust Exemption in Insurance Markets (1993), while
banks enlisted the government to prohibit price competition for deposits, see Kenneth E.
Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1
(1977). The club form of organization in other industries also reinforced the overall
system-if clients were characterized by club organization, they would also display features
such as low mobility of personnel that could give durability to relationships with service
providers. Thus, the phenomenon of club organization appears to be a relatively far-
reaching feature of economic organization during the period in question.
13. F. Leary Davis, Back to the Future: The Buyer's Market and the Need for Law Firm
Leadership, Creativity and Innovation, 16 Campbell L. Rev. 147, 148 (1994).
14. Id. at 152.
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The reduced barriers to entry are reflected in bar admission statistics. 15
After a brief rise following World War II, the rate of new bar admissions
remained stable at 8000 to 10,000 a year until the mid-1960s. Admissions
then began to rise modestly, reaching just over 15,000 per year in 1971. In
1972, admissions rose sharply to over 20,000. The trend continued, and
yearly admissions exceeded 30,000 in 1979. During the 1980s, new
admissions averaged about 30,000 a year, but because the cohorts of young
attorneys entering the profession were larger than the cohorts that were
leaving, the attorney population continued to rise. Thus, the number of
attorneys in the economy has soared, both in absolute terms and as a
percentage of the population. 16 Increases in the number of attorneys may
translate into enhanced competition in the bar. 17
These increases in the attorney population tell only part of the story. The
ability of attorneys to maintain the exclusivity of the franchise through the
enforcement of unauthorized practice restrictions is also increasingly
suspect. Non-attorneys are performing tasks previously monopolized by
lawyers, and even computers can do some of the work.18 The prospect of
15. See Clara N. Carson, The Lawyer Statistical Report: The U.S. Legal Profession in
1995 (1999).
16. This is illustrated in the following table:
U.S. Lawyer Population and Population/Lawyer Ratio in Selected Years
Year Number of Lawyers Lawyer/Population Ratio
1951 221,605 1/695
1960 285,933 1/627
1971 355,242 1/572
1980 542,205 1/418
1985 655,191 1/360
1988 723,189 1/340
1991 805,872 1/313
1995 857,931 1/303
2000 1,066,328 1/264
Id. at 1-2.
17. The demand side must be considered along with the supply side to establish this
relationship with certainty. While the number of attorneys has grown, both in absolute terms
and relative to population, so has the demand for legal services. Government regulation has
increased for many business sectors. There is also a perception that plaintiffs' attorneys
have become more active, better financed, and more sophisticated, and that trial lawyers
have exercised political influence to obtain changes in liability regimes that generate
increases in litigation exposure for large corporations. Whatever the cause, the data does
substantiate significant increases in demand. Robert L. Nelson reports that "[b]etween 1977
and 1989, revenues devoted to legal services increased by some 480%"-a rate of expansion
more than twice that of gross national product (which expanded by 260%), and greater even
than health care (which grew by 370%). Robert L. Nelson, The Futures of American
Lawyers: A Demographic Profile of a Changing Profession in a Changing Society, 44 Case
W. Res. L. Rev. 345, 345 (1994). While the supply of attorneys is not going to shrink over
the medium term, the demand for attorney services could easily do so as a result of
fluctuations in market conditions or the business cycle.
18. See Herbert M. Kritzer, The Future Role of "Law Workers": Rethinking the Forms
of Legal Practice and the Scope of Legal Education, 44 Ariz. L. Rev. 917 (2002); Herbert
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multidisciplinary practice groups also poses a threat, as evidenced by the
ABA's repudiation of the concept as a general model for American legal
practice. 19
Demographic changes have also dramatically altered the practice of law.
Women now represent close to half of all new attorneys, 20 and as time
passes, their representation in the bar as a whole should also grow to about
fifty percent. African-American and Latino/Latina attorneys are entering
the bar in substantial numbers.21 Even though new lawyers still tend to
come from relatively privileged backgrounds,22 the era of the old-boy
network, the country club connection, and the white shoe firm, if not
eclipsed, is certainly fading.23  The personal connections that once
maintained the club system have given way to a varied, shifting,
multifaceted pattern of relationships. Connections as a means for entry,
acceptance, and advancement are not gone, of course, and probably will
never disappear, but the exclusivity of the old system has been supplanted
by a different, more flexible, and more open environment.
Legal constraints on competition in the market for legal services have
also eroded. The old system of minimum fee schedules received its quietus
in 1975, when the U.S. Supreme Court declared that such arrangements, if
not required by state law, amounted to price fixing in violation of the
Sherman Act.24 The Court also took on restraints on attorney marketing.
Restrictions on truthful attorney advertising are today generally outlawed as
violations of the First Amendment if they significantly restrict commercial
speech.25  Even direct solicitation of clients is permitted if done for
ideological rather than commercial purposes. 26 These changes in legal
M. Kritzer, The Professions Are Dead, Long Live the Professions: Legal Practice in a
Postprofessional World, 33 Law & Soc'y Rev. 713 (1999).
19. See generally Charles W. Wolfram, Comparative Multi-Disciplinary Practice of
Law: Paths Taken and Not Taken, 52 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 961 (2002).
20. See Ronit Dinovitzer et al., After the JD: First Results of a National Study of Legal
Careers 19 (2004) (finding that forty-six percent of new attorneys are women).
21. See id. (finding that seventeen percent of new lawyers in survey were non-White).
22. See id. at 20 (finding that sixty-nine percent of new lawyers' fathers were managers
or professionals, as compared with twenty percent in the general workforce).
23. See id. (reporting that Protestants no longer dominate the practice of corporate law as
they once did).
24. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
25. See, e.g., Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990)
(plurality opinion); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of
Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Bates v. State
Bar of Az., 433 U.S. 350 (1977). But see Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995)
(upholding a Florida Bar rule that prohibited personal injury lawyers from sending direct-
mail solicitations targeted to victims and their relatives within thirty days of an accident).
26. See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (permitting in-person solicitation by
accountants); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978). But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,
436 U.S. 447 (1978) (holding that the state could sanction an attorney's "ambulance
chasing" solicitation of vulnerable clients for financial gain).
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doctrine have probably worked to increase competition in the market for
legal services. 27
Associated with these developments are perceived changes in the internal
norms of the profession. The rule against poaching clients appears
moribund today; any large firm is willing to offer its services to a desirable
account, even if the client is known to be currently represented by another
law firm. Many believe that professional courtesy has deteriorated in other
respects as well. The bar, it is said, is plagued by an epidemic of incivility.
Attorneys wait only for the judge to leave the courtroom before launching
verbal assaults at one another or at the opposing counsel's client,28 and
litigation tactics appear calculated as much to impose inconvenience on the
adversary as to advance the client's legal position in court.
Restraints on mobility have also become less binding. Today, it is not
uncommon for attorneys to move from firm to firm several times during a
career. 29 Frequently, when attorneys move, they take significant clients
with them. Indeed, client portability is usually the reason such moves are
feasible. And because bringing the client along is often the sine qua non, it
is not unusual to find whole practice groups jumping ship. Often, too, the
mobility takes the form of a whole-firm merger in which established firms
are swallowed up by leviathans such as Skadden, Arps or Baker &
McKenzie in the United States, or Freshfields or Lovells in the U.K.
Sometimes mobility is the product of a firm's demise. Brobeck, Phleger &
Harrison's closure in 2003, and the ensuing exodus of Brobeck attorneys to
other firms, was only a recent example of a series of similar events in the
past few years.
Loyalty between law firms and their longstanding clients has also faded.
Whereas major clients would once have been content to use a single law
firm for all important legal matters, today clients tend to diversify their
portfolio of service providers. Most major companies have significant in-
house legal offices which can perform sophisticated work to control costs
and monitor the quality of services performed. When outside counsel is
used, a large client is likely to diversify by using different firms for
specialized services, such as regulatory work, tax planning, and litigation. 30
Large clients, moreover, have become more price-sensitive and may not
hesitate to question bills or negotiate favorable retainer agreements.
Contingency fees have become, if not common, at least an accepted part of
27. See Abel, supra note 11, at 121-22 (concluding that these changes did not reduce the
price of legal services).
28. See, e.g., In re The Discipline of Eicher, 661 N.W.2d 354, 358 (S.D. 2003) (noting
that the attorney characterized the opposing client as "despicable" and "shockingly greedy").
29. For example, approximately a third of the attorneys who graduated from law school
in 2000 had changed jobs at least once within four years. See Dinovitzer, supra note 20, at
53.
30. See Davis, supra note 13, at 164 (noting that in-house counsel increasingly seeks
transactional rather than general assistance from outside law firms).
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commercial representation; 31 such fees facilitate competitive bidding for
legal work because they are clearly defined by outcomes, and therefore
require less of a background of trust between lawyer and client.
Developments in the clients' industries also affect attorney-client
relations. American business has become more competitive over the past
half century. Globalization and competition by foreign suppliers have been
important factors. But a number of changes in the law have also influenced
many industries. The elimination of fixed commissions for securities
brokers, deregulation of the airline, trucking, and telecommunications
industries, and the dismantling of legal restraints on commercial banking
have enhanced competition in those industries. Firms facing price
competition are likely to try to cut costs, including legal bills. Since the
1970s, moreover, waves of mergers and divestitures have altered the
identities of many corporations. 32 Even if a corporation did not want to
switch lawyers, the company may not have a choice after a merger, due to
conflicts of interest or because the merger partner wishes to use its own
counsel. And companies are no longer squeamish about changing lawyers,
even in the absence of structural changes. Although they may not switch
law firms as often as advertising agencies, even long-standing client
relationships are no longer sacrosanct.
Increases in mobility have altered the internal structure of law firms as
well. Compensation systems are one area of change. The "Cravath"
strategy of lockstep partner compensation has given way nearly everywhere
to "performance-based" pay. And because attorneys these days can leave
firms and take clients with them, control over billing has become the most
important factor in divvying up the profits in performance-based systems.
The "eat-what-you-kill" approach is commonplace. Some law firms have
become little more than franchisors offering office space and secretarial
services to practice groups.
Firm demographics have also changed. Firms providing representation
to big corporations have grown much larger, in general, and have taken on
legions of younger associates. The growth in size of major corporate firms
has been due, in part, to the economics of partner compensation. 33 Mark
Galanter and Thomas Paley, in their influential book Tournament of
Lawyers, document and attempt to explain this trend.34 Partners earn much
31. See, e.g., Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison v. Telex Corp., 602 F.2d 866 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 981 (1979) (involving a $1 million contingent fee in a commercial
case).
32. See generally Neil Fligstein, The Transformation of Corporate Control 336 (1990).
33. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law
Firm: The Economics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 567 (1989); Ronald J.
Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry
into the Corporate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 313 (1985).
34. Marc Galanter & Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of
the Big Law Firm (1991); see also Robert L. Nelson, Partners with Power: The Social
Transformation of the Large Law Firm (1988); Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams,
Why Are There So Many Lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 Law & Soc.
Inquiry 431 (1989).
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of their compensation by billing out associates at rates higher than what the
associates cost the firm. To increase profits, partners maintain a high
partner-associate ratio. However, as the ratio increases, partners face
problems of monitoring associates for quality and ensuring that they work
hard. Galanter and Palay's "tournament" model explains how the tension
between monitoring and profitability is maintained. Some associates-
those who work extremely hard and produce excellent work-will "win"
the tournament by being promoted to partner and thus obtaining the
financial rewards associated with that status. Because associates want to
win the tournament, they are willing to work long hours and strive to do the
best possible job, even with relatively light supervision. Whether or not the
tournament model fully explains the relationship between partners and
associates, only a fraction of the associates at large corporate firms will be
made partners; most move on within five to seven years. Because of this,
lateral job mobility at corporate law firms is as high-or higher-among
associates as it is among partners.
Lawyers also face increasing costs. Overhead costs include office space
rental and costs of technology (data processing, storage, and retrieval). Big
law firms also carry big payrolls. Costs of associates have been high
because salaries skyrocketed during the period of greatest growth, in the
late 1980s to early 2000s.35 Although associates usually are hired on an at-
will basis, downsizing can be costly, not only because of the need to buy
out redundant employees, but also because of the signal that layoffs send to
the market. Many firms would probably prefer to wait out a down time,
even at a loss, rather than incur the costs of cutting back.36 Moreover, firms
often finance these costs with borrowed money, adding the costs of debt
service into the mix. Lenders demand to be repaid, and if law firms default,
the partners are likely to face personal liability to make good the shortfall.
B. The Share Market Bubble
If the tectonics of the legal profession has been the slow drift from club
to competitive organization, its meteorology was the share market bubble
that impacted American financial markets between 1995 and 2000. The
bubble and its painful aftermath affected elite legal services in ways which,
if perhaps not significant in the long term, have had substantial short-term
effects .37
35. See Bruce M. Price, New Institutions of the Knowledge Economy: A Sociological
Study of Equity Billing by Law Firms in Silicon Valley in 1998-1999, at 75-90 (Sept. 13,
2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York University) (on file with author).
36. Firms can cover themselves to some extent against the risk of a downturn by using
temporary workers to cover peak demand, but temporary workers have costs of their own
(they have to be brought up to speed and carefully supervised, and may not be as capable as
regular employees).
37. For an interesting explanation of the relationship between the share market bubble
and gatekeeper failure, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 301, 323-27 (2004) [hereinafter
2005] 1119
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Just as the share market bubble was more pronounced in the high-tech
sector than in the rest of the economy, so law firms serving high tech clients
were most profoundly affected. The stratospheric trajectory of many high-
tech initial public offerings created opportunities for firms working for
fledgling high-tech clients to take an equity interest in the firms that they
represented, in hopes that the expected increase in share price after the
offering would more than compensate them for the lack of cash
compensation at the time the services were rendered.38 Wilson Sonsini was
the best known-but not the only firm-to adopt this strategy. But because
the bubble turned out to be market-wide, and not just restricted to tech
stocks, the effect of the bubble was felt in the practices of many law firms.
Any firm with clients in the financial sector stood to profit from increases in
transactions and in the profits that financial market clients were earning
during this period. Law firms in financial centers, notably New York,
profited as well because of the effects of the financial market bubble on the
economies of these areas.
The bubble economy disguised growing weaknesses in the underlying
market for legal services. Law firms could get by on the profits they were
making from financial markets-related work. When the boom ended, in
2000 and 2001, the bottom dropped out of this market. Firms that were
heavily involved in the financial sector or in representing high-tech clients
found themselves in free fall. A few-most notably Brobeck, Phleger &
Harrison-were unable to recover. Despite being one of the leading firms
in the country in profits per partner in 2000, Brobeck shut its doors
permanently in 2003. 39
The bubble economy also had important effects on the demands clients
made of their attorneys. During a stock market bubble, underlying
conditions in the real economy can, for a time, become hidden in the
apparent prosperity of the equity price run-up. As market participants
began to believe that share price increases would continue, it became
possible for companies to finance themselves with equity-or even with
warrants that could not be exercised until the stock reached even greater
heights. Firms could become their own bankers; rather than turning to
lenders for financing, they could simply issue stock to fund their
acquisitions. Accounting measures of profitability became subject to
manipulation because poor results from operations could be offset by sales
of appreciated assets. It became nearly a fetish during this period for firms
to show steadily increasing profits. Managers of firms turned to their
lawyers to help them realize these objectives.
Gatekeeper Failure and Reform]; John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron? A Capsule
Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 Cornell L. Rev. 269, 293-98 (2004).
38. For an interesting study of the phenomenon of equity investments by attorneys in
dot.com clients, see Price, supra note 35.
39. See Ann Grimes, Brobeck Law Firm Could Dissolve As Merger Folds, Wall St. J.,
Jan. 31, 2003, at B2; Brenda Sandburg, Brobeck to End Turmoil by Going Out of Business,
Nat'l L.J., Feb. 3, 2003, at A15.
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Executive compensation also played a role. Part of the problem was tax-
driven. In 1994, Congress, in a perhaps ill-considered bow to populist
resentment, restricted the deductibility of executive salaries over $1 million
per year in publicly traded companies.40 This increased the desirability of
using stock options for managerial compensation, since options did not cost
the company anything out of pocket when issued, yet they provided real
value to managers. (Options did, of course, potentially dilute the interests
of the company's shareholders.) From the managers' point of view, options
became desirable because share prices began to rise dramatically. As the
bubble economy took hold, it looked like nearly any option could quickly
be in the money. Furthermore, the use of options appeared to jibe with the
ideology of free markets. By enhancing managers' equity interests in the
companies they served, options appeared well designed to align the
incentives of managers with those of shareholders, and thus promised to
reduce the agency costs of management. Accordingly, companies engaged
in massive issuance of options to their senior officers during the 1990s.
41
Another effect of the bubble economy was psychological. As belief in
the inevitability of share price increases grew, market participants
disregarded ordinary caution about economic realities. They began to
believe that things really were different, that the laws of gravity had been
repealed when it came to share prices, and that old-fashioned warning
signals such as price-earnings ratios could be ignored. The mood of the
entire market became euphoric. It is possible that some attorneys came to
share that effervescence, and accordingly found it necessary to maintain, in
the public mind, a relentlessly upbeat picture of corporate performance,
even when a realistic, sober assessment would encourage caution.
III. CHANGING INCENTIVES AND ATTORNEY INDEPENDENCE
Part I of this Essay illustrated how Professor Gilson's model of value
creation does not fully apply to legal compliance and corporate governance
activities by private attorneys. Part II identified both the bubble economy
of 1995-2000 and the legal profession's evolution from club to competitive
organization as salient factors affecting the incentives facing attorneys in
elite law practices. This Essay now addresses the question posed at the
outset of this article: How have changing economic conditions affected
lawyers' independence in representing business clients? This part now
argues that these developments significantly altered the cost-benefit
calculation facing attorneys confronted with the question of whether to
exercise independence.
40. See I.R.C. § 162(m) (2000) (denying deductibility to chief executive officer and top
officer pay in excess of $1 million annually unless the excess consists of options or is based
upon the achievement of performance goals that have been established by a compensation
committee composed solely of independent outside directors).
41. See Krista J. Berk et al., Board Practices 1997: The Structure and Compensation of
Boards of Directors at S&P Super 1500 Companies 44 (1997) (finding that 80.3% of S&P
500 firms awarded directors stock or options in 1997).
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Attorneys operating under competitive organization have lower
incentives and ability to monitor one another to detect and deter
misconduct. Because attorneys receive compensation today based partly on
their own performance, their financial interests are not as closely tied to the
actions of their partners as in years past. These lawyers have fewer
incentives to ensure that their partners are serving other clients well.
Further, maintaining the firm's reputation may not be as important in
competitive organization as it was in the club system. In an "eat-what-you-
kill" system, a partner's compensation depends on whether a client came to
him personally, or to his practice group. If the firm gets a client because of
the firm's reputation, the attorney is unlikely to receive as large a
percentage of the revenues from that client, even if he becomes the billing
partner. The likelihood that the attorney will eventually leave the law firm
further reduces the attorney's connection to the firm's long-range interests.
Because attorneys are likely to be less concerned with maintaining the
firm's overall reputation, they have less incentive to check up on how other
attorneys are conducting their practices.
Attorneys also have incentives to avoid exposing their own work to
monitoring by other lawyers within a firm. In an "eat-what-you-kill"
compensation environment, attorneys may avoid sharing details of their
practices with others in the firm out of fear that weaknesses in their
performance will lead to reduced compensation, or that other attorneys in
the firm may poach their clients.
Increases in firm size also affect monitoring incentives. When a firm is
relatively small, each attorney is likely to feel responsibility for others in
the firm. When a firm grows large, however, the sense of obligation
dissipates. Responsibility for monitoring attorneys becomes the job of the
executive committee. And even executive committees may lack the ability
to effectively monitor attorneys in mega-firms. In especially large firms,
monitoring may take the form of reviewing billings and profitability-not
the sort of scrutiny that is calculated to enhance ethical behavior by
lawyers.
The transition from club to competitive organization also adversely
affected the ability of lawyers to monitor their clients. To effectively
oversee a client's activities, a lawyer must have knowledge of the client's
conduct, the ability to influence the client's actions, and the proper
incentives to influence the actions in the right way. The attorney-client
relationships under the club system accomplished all three of these
objectives. Under the club system, the longstanding relationship between
lawyer and client often gave the lawyer a comprehensive understanding of
the client's business-knowledge based not only on extensive involvement
over time with the client's legal problems, but also on a long history of
personal interactions with the client's senior managers. The rich network of
relationships that existed under the club system also provided attorneys
with a nuanced and effective palette of resources to employ in order to
encourage the client to avoid testing legal limits. A word spoken on the
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golf course could sometimes accomplish as much as a formal memorandum
to the board of directors. Further, the pattern of interactions between
lawyers and client management made conflicts with the attorney costly to
the client because valued friendships and personal business relationships
might be jeopardized (although, because the attorneys would incur similar
costs, the risk of a breach might also deter counsel from threatening to sever
the relationship).
Attorneys operating within the club system also had good incentives to
use their knowledge and influence in a constructive way. Because of their
long-standing relationship, lawyers identified emotionally with the client's
long-range institutional interests. Counsel also had economic interests in
the client-in the form of an anticipated income stream-that promoted a
long-range perspective on the client's affairs. Attorneys under the club
system were not likely to be swayed by the prospects for a quick fix of the
company's financial statements if the result was only to put off even more
serious problems until another day.
These advantages of the club system dissipated under competitive
organization. In a competitive market, relationships between attorneys and
clients are more transitory and based only on the lawyer's work on formal
legal matters. Since lawyers do not develop a deeper relationship with the
client from personal interactions, attorneys under the competitive system
are likely to operate with less knowledge of the client's affairs and
institutional processes. The client may also be less willing to share
information with the attorney, because the two are operating at arms length
on compensation and retention matters, and because the client may not want
to provide the attorney with facts that could complicate matters if the client
wishes to change counsel. The attorney's influence with the client is also
less substantial under the competitive system. Without extensive
interpersonal bonds, the attorney may not know how to manage the political
forces within a client in order to achieve legal compliance and avoid
questionable activities.
Moreover, under the competitive system, attorneys' interests are not
aligned with the long-range best interests of the client. Lawyers today are
less likely to identify emotionally with the client as an institution and more
likely to perceive their interests as tied to the particular officers who
allocate legal work-individuals whose own interests may not be fully
aligned with those of the institution. Moreover, because under competitive
organization the law firm cannot be confident of being retained by the client
indefinitely, the firm's perspective is foreshortened: The lawyers will
discount their expectation of receiving a future income stream by the
probability of being replaced by other counsel, and thus they will focus
more on producing short run results for the client than on the client's long
term well-being. These factors suggest that attorneys under competitive
organization are likely to be less effective monitors than they were under
club organization.
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Competitive organization also increases the bargaining power of clients
against their attorneys. Clients possess a realistic ability to switch counsel,
even when they have a longstanding relationship with a firm. The elaborate
network of contacts, loyalties, and obligations that bonded law firms and
corporate clients together under club organization has largely disappeared.
In today's competitive environment, there are always plenty of firms eager
to bid for a client's business. Thus, as the market for legal services has
grown more competitive, the social structure that enables lawyers to act as
an independent "conscience" for their clients has dissipated. When it comes
to relationships between law firms and their corporate clients, no-fault
divorce is now the standard.
The threat of client defection can be a powerful antidote to attorney
independence in an "eat-what-you-kill" environment. Each attorney's
welfare in such a system is tied to billings from a few clients. The risk of
losing a client is not as diversified for that attorney as it would be under a
lockstep system in which client losses and gains are spread among all the
partners. Thus, losing a major client can be personally devastating.
Clients, knowing this fact, can exercise leverage over the attorney by
threatening to leave the firm-or even by requesting reassignment to a
different partner within the firm.
The fear of losing a client also applies to firms as a whole. It is true that,
under the "eat-what-you-kill" system, each attorney is less exposed to
losses of clients by other attorneys, and it is also true that, as law firms
grow in size, the risk of losing a client becomes more diversified.
Nevertheless, no firm wants to lose a major client, both because the
reduction in billings will affect all attorneys' compensation to some extent,
and because defection of a big account can be demoralizing within the firm
and damaging to its reputation outside. Moreover, even when firms become
very large, major clients can still represent a significant share of their
billings.
The financial structure of law firms in a competitive environment also
reduces a firm's bargaining leverage vis-A-vis clients. The huge base of
associates at large firms creates a payroll obligation which, as noted above,
is not particularly flexible in the short run. Firms also face other financial
commitments, including office leases and debt service. The need to satisfy
these obligations generates an imperative to maintain billings. Further, the
"tournament of lawyers" works only if there is, in fact, a tournament. Even
if they have some flexibility at the margin to cull out weaker candidates in
tough economic times, law firms must continue to promote associates.
Unless the firm is in the position to boast that it turns away more work than
it accepts, the threat of losing a significant source of billings carries with it
the possibility of financial repercussions. These considerations make it
dangerous for a law firm to exercise independence in representing a client if
doing so risks losing the client's business.
Moreover, even if a law firm did attempt to exercise independence, the
exercise might be futile. Clients can easily find other firms willing to do
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their work, and they can probably find a firm that is more willing to test the
edges of the permissible. A firm that exercises independence may find
itself simply losing billings without deterring the client's wrongful conduct.
If a firm perceives that resisting the client's demands would only be self-
defeating, the firm may be less likely to attempt the exercise in the first
place. And if clients understand that they can easily change counsel, they
may be more inclined to push for actions that approach the line of what is
legally permissible.42
Even if attorneys have experienced a significant reduction in their
bargaining leverage against clients over matters of legal compliance, this
would not necessarily be problematic so long as clients did not want
attorneys to assist them in questionable actions. However, evidence from
Enron and other similar cases indicates that some clients do want their
attorneys to push the envelope. Such client pressure can be understood, in
part, as a product of the same economic conditions discussed throughout
this Essay. Just as the legal business has become more competitive, so has
the business of many clients. Pressed to make profits in a competitive
environment, clients may pressure attorneys to test or bend the law.
The bubble economy also played a role. During the boom years,
companies tended to advance employees who were relentless optimists and
risk takers, and who sometimes had a deaf ear for cautionary signals. The
risk preference and capacity for denial displayed by these individuals was
further accentuated when stock options became important aspects of
executive pay. Managers holding large portfolios of options benefited from
increasing the volatility of their firms. Thus, managers with significant
option compensation were encouraged to take inappropriate risks-a feature
of option-based compensation that was perhaps noted but little appreciated
during the heyday of the bubble. Even more troubling, these individuals
found it to be in their interests to manipulate public perceptions of the
performance of their companies to enhance the value of their options and to
reinforce the perception that all was well in their firms. The temptation to
use any means, fair or foul, to achieve this result sometimes proved
irresistible.
The manipulability of financial statements in a bubble economy also
generated imperatives for managers to present ever-improving financial
statements to the investing public. While some degree of earnings
smoothing may be legitimate to avoid misleading the market, the process of
adjusting earnings can easily turn into deception. "Smoothing" becomes a
euphemism for fraud. The pressure to present positive financial results
every quarter leads officers of some public companies to go over that line.
To achieve such desired results, they need to enlist the services of lawyers.
42. The analysis of whether attorney withdrawal is in fact relatively painless for the
client is complicated, however, by the question of the signal that such withdrawal might
communicate to others-a matter discussed in the final section of this Essay.
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Finally, the intoxicating gas that inflated the share market bubble also
may have played a role. It is possible that some attorneys were so caught
up in the euphoria of soaring stock prices that they were able to persuade
themselves that any questionable activities would never come to light, or
that, if discovered, it would be understood as justified by the spirit of the
times.
Overall, the far-reaching economic developments-the evolution from
club to competitive organization in the legal services industry and, during
the late 1990s, the share market boom-had more to do with causing the
problems at Enron and other companies than any erosion in the private
ethics of corporate lawyers. 43 Given the enormous pressures that these
developments created, it is not surprising that some lawyers failed to exhibit
the ideal degree of independence for counsel in such important positions.
What is perhaps noteworthy is that more attorneys did not fall into the trap.
Nevertheless, it is unfortunate that any went over the line. It would serve
the public interest to deter such conduct, if this could be done without
creating greater costs than the harms being prevented. The next part of this
Essay offers tentative and preliminary thoughts about possible reform
strategies.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM
Since changing economic conditions have reduced the ability of business
lawyers to stand up to corporate clients when necessary, the question
becomes whether the regulatory system should respond. Should business
lawyers be placed under obligations to protect the public interest, even at
some cost to their undivided loyalty to clients?
A natural but facile argument against such reform efforts is a visceral
defense of zealous advocacy. An advocate, Lord Henry Brougham
famously observed, "knows but one person in all the world, and that person
is his client."'44 Under this strong view of undivided loyalty, the attorney is
bound to defend the client with every legitimate means at his disposal. In
the criminal context, this means attempting to raise doubts of guilt even by
sophistry, innuendo, and deception short of falsehood. Even in the civil
context, the lawyer can and should use all available means to advance the
client's interests. The ideal of pure and energetic loyalty resonates with
lawyers.
However appealing these images might be, they are misplaced in the
context of corporate representation. In the case that generated Lord
Brougham's encomium, Queen Caroline was accused of cuckolding the
King of England; she faced the resources of the Crown in his divorce suit
against her and needed all the help she could get.45 The lawyer's undivided
43. Whether attorneys at Enron or other fraud-ridden companies in fact went over the
line of permissible legal representation will presumably be determined in the legal process.
44. Trial of Queen Caroline 3, in 2 Causes C6lbres 1 (1874).
45. See generally Roger Fulford, The Trial of Queen Caroline (1967).
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loyalty to the client was a means of leveling the playing field in which the
adversarial contest occurred. Similarly, we accept some level of sophistry
as appropriate for criminal defense counsel, because of the perceived
imbalance between the resources of the state and those available to the
defendant, and because the defendant's liberty is at stake. But this is not
the setting of recent corporate frauds. When attorneys represent corporate
clients in compliance matters or in corporate cases where the agency costs
of management are high, the imbalance is reversed. The risk in these
settings is that the attorney's skills will be employed to take inappropriate
advantage of the public at large or of disorganized and unrepresented
shareholders. Strong norms of loyalty to clients may not be necessary to
protect the public interest in these settings.
How, then, should the incentives of attorneys be adjusted to achieve
optimum behavior from a societal point of view? Ideally, attorney's
interests would be aligned with the public's interest. If this were the case,
there would be no need to worry about enforcement, because the attorney's
own self-interest would take care of the public's interest as well. However,
it is difficult to achieve this alignment. The "public interest" is notoriously
difficult to identify. Moreover, the public interest, whatever it is, would not
necessarily be served if attorneys ensured that their clients never tested the
limits of the law; there is no fence around the law to avoid close encounters
with the impermissible. "[T]he very meaning of a line in the law," Justice
Oliver Wendell Holmes observed, "is that you intentionally may go as close
to it as you can if you do not pass it.' ' 46 And because the law is not always
clear, even good legal representation will result from time to time in clients
going too far. If lawyers always dissuaded their clients from even
approaching the line, companies would be over-deterred, because
lawmakers set legal standards with the premise that anything short of
overstepping the boundaries of the law is pelrmissible. Lawyers who too
zealously guard the law's outer boundaries will often be "deal-killers" who
harm rather than help the public interest.
One could imagine an attempt to set up an incentive-compatible
compensation system for lawyers that would at least align their interests
with the long-range best interests of their corporate clients. Such a system
might help if the expected income stream from the client was sufficiently
extended in time. For example, attorneys might be paid in the form of
options with strike dates spread out over a period of years, or might receive
vested rights to receive treasury stock at periodic intervals. Because the
compensation would be tied to the performance of the company over time,
the recipient would have the incentive to take the company's long-range
best interests into account in formulating his advice. Service providers in
such a case might be less willing to assist managers in deceiving financial
markets in the short run at the cost of the company's welfare in the long
run. Such compensation systems might be worth exploring, although it is
46. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395-96 (1930) (citation omitted).
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not clear they would be feasible. 47 Moreover, even if a compensation
system could align the incentives of service providers with the long-range
best interests of their clients, this would not necessarily equate with service
to the public interest, because a client's long-range interests might differ
from those of the public.
An alternative approach is to formulate concrete behavioral rules
governing attorney conduct. Such rules hold some promise for addressing
the perceived deficit in attorney independence. They must, however, be
designed cautiously. For example, the share price bubble of 1995-2000
contributed to some of the worst recent cases of attorney misconduct. This
phenomenon should not provide a justification for reforms. While the
bubble's effects were no doubt profound, they were also limited in time. It
is unlikely that a similar share price boom will occur for a considerable
period. Reforms that might be appropriate in a boom setting are unlikely to
be desirable in normal times. It would be a mistake to overreact to the
events of the bubble economy by adopting structural reforms whose long-
range costs may exceed their benefits. 48
The transition from club to competitive organization, however, does
provide justification for structural reform, since the development is
profound, long-standing, and unlikely to change. The question is whether
and to what extent this development warrants structural changes in the rules
governing legal representation of corporate clients. The remainder of this
part briefly addresses four such recommendations, each of which has been
put forward as a possible policy response to the problems that manifested
themselves in Enron and other disasters. The goal is not to
comprehensively analyze each of these four proposals, but rather to draw
out implications for these proposals given the legal profession's evolution
from club to competitive organization.
A. Up-the-Ladder Reporting
One such reform is the adoption of express instructions to attorneys to
engage in "up-the-ladder" reporting of client misconduct. Such a
requirement has recently been imposed for lawyers representing clients
before the SEC. The SEC's final rule implementing section 307 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act49 requires that lawyers who become aware of
"evidence of a material violation" must report their discovery to
47. Among other problems, they would be costly to the client because the service
provider would have to be compensated for the significant loss of liquidity and increase in
undiversified risk.
48. See Gatekeeper Failure and Reform, supra note 37, at 330 (observing that to the
extent gatekeeper failure was due to the share market bubble, "the problem may be self-
correcting").
49. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities
Act Release No. 8185, Exchange Act Release No. 47,276, Investment Company Act Release
No. 25,919, 68 Fed. Reg. 6296 (Feb. 6, 2003) [hereinafter Adopting Release], available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm.
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successively higher levels of authority within the client company. 50 An
attorney who discovers such evidence may report the evidence to the
company's Chief Legal Officer ("CLO") and, if appropriate, the company's
Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"). Upon receiving such a report, the CLO
is required either to investigate the report or to refer the evidence to the
company's Qualified Legal Compliance Committee ("QLCC"), if such a
committee exists. If the CLO investigates and concludes that there is an
ongoing material violation, he must notify the reporting attorney and take
all reasonable steps to ensure that the company responds appropriately. If
the CLO refers the matter to the QLCC, it is then the committee's job to
take the appropriate action. If the reporting attorney receives an appropriate
response from the CLO, no further action is required. If, however, the
reporting attorney does not receive an appropriate response, he or she must
go up the corporate ladder by reporting the matter to the audit committee, a
different committee of independent directors, or the full board. If the
reporting attorney reasonably believes that it would be futile to report
evidence of a material violation lower in the corporate hierarchy, he may
report the matter directly to the QLCC or the full board of directors.
These rules apply only to attorneys who practice before the SEC. Under
ABA Model Rule 1.13(b), if an attorney for an organization knows that a
corporate officer is engaged in (or intends to engage in) a violation of a
legal obligation to the company or an illegal action that might be imputed to
the company, and the conduct in question is likely to result in substantial
injury to the organization, the attorney must "proceed as is reasonably
necessary in the best interest of the organization." Unless the lawyer
reasonably believes it is not necessarily in the best interest of the
organization to do so, he must refer the matter "to higher authority in the
organization, including, if warranted by the circumstances, to the highest
authority that can act on behalf of the organization as determined by
applicable law." 51
Up-the-ladder reporting can be a constructive reform in light of the legal
profession's shift from club to competitive organization. As we have seen,
under competitive organization, law firms have less bargaining leverage
with clients than under club organization. Clients that wish to test legal
limits can select law firms that are willing to overlook problems. And
because law firms need clients, they will face competitive pressures to offer
lax supervision. 52 One means for testing the limits is for the client's board
50. As used in the rule, "evidence" means "credible evidence, based upon which it
would be unreasonable, under the circumstances, for a prudent and competent attorney not to
conclude that it is reasonably likely that a material violation has occurred, is ongoing, or is
about to occur." Id. § 205.2(e). A "material violation" means "a material violation of an
applicable United States federal or state securities law, a material breach of fiduciary duty
arising under United States federal or state law, or a similar material violation of any United
States federal or state law." Id. § 205.2(i).
51. Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.13(b) (2003).
52. This is not to say that all law firms would give in to these pressures. In fact, law
firms that do not bend to a client's wishes can develop valuable reputations as rigorous
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of directors to be kept uninformed. Senior executives who have the most to
gain can keep the information to themselves. If up-the-ladder reporting is
not mandatory, law firms that want to assist clients in limit testing will not
report. But mandatory up-the-ladder reporting would disrupt the current
incentive structure, because all firms have the obligation to inform higher
authority. Although some law firms might elect to ignore this obligation,
they would face sanctions if their failure to report ever came to light (as it
would, for example, if the client declared bankruptcy or otherwise fell into
the hands of new management). Thus, mandatory up-the-ladder reporting
could be a sensible means for enhancing firms' bargaining leverage with
corporate clients on compliance and fiduciary duty matters.53
B. Noisy Withdrawal
Another type of reform measure is requiring "noisy withdrawal" if a
client fails to take remedial action after being alerted of a problem by the
attorney. The metaphor of "noise" is used for two somewhat conflicting
purposes. On the one hand, noise commands attention. The idea suggests
that the attorney's action gives regulators a signal that all is not right with
the client's legal compliance. On the other hand, noise interferes with
communication by crowding out meaningful information with signals that
are not meaningful. The term thus conveys the idea that the withdrawal
disguises whatever attorney-client confidences may have precipitated the
lawyer's decision.
The SEC proposed a noisy withdrawal obligation as part of its
regulations implementing section 307 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,54 but the
monitors. By employing these law firms, clients can signal to regulators, the investment
community, and other interested parties that they are willing to subject themselves to an
independent legal audit. However, only a limited number of law firms can occupy this
market niche. Among other things, such a law firm needs to be able to demonstrate that it is
selective about work. When a law firm boasts that it turns away clients, it signals that it can
afford to be a rigorous monitor because it can withdraw from any of its accounts without
incurring unacceptable financial costs. But not many law firms are in this position.
53. Much depends, of course, on the specific definitions and text of the requirement.
For example, the Securities Exchange Commission's ("SEC's") rule is considerably more
stringent than the American Bar Association's ("ABA's"). Under the ABA rule, attorneys
have an "out" if they conclude that a referral would not be in the best interests of the
organization, a feature that is lacking under the SEC approach. See Model Rules of Prof'l
Conduct R. 1.13(b). The ABA rule, moreover, applies only when an attorney "knows" of an
actual or intended violation. The SEC rule does not require knowledge of facts or
conclusions of law, but only "evidence of a material violation." Adopting Release, supra
note 49, § 205.2(e). Thus, the general up-the-ladder reporting requirement under ABA Rule
1.13 is weaker than under the corresponding SEC rule. This difference may be justified
because the ABA rule applies across the board to many different forms of legal
representation, whereas the SEC rule applies in a special context that has proven to be
especially problematic in recent years.
54. Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities Act
Release 8150, Exchange Act Release No. 46,868, Investment Company Act Release No.
25,829, 67 Fed. Reg. 71,670 (Dec. 2, 2002), available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-
8150.htm. For a generally favorable analysis of the SEC's proposal, see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
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agency omitted the requirement from its final rule. 55  However,
contemporaneously with issuing the final rule, the SEC extended its request
for comments on the noisy withdrawal proposal. 56 Under the proposed rule,
when an issuer's attorney complies with the obligations of the up-the-ladder
reporting requirement but does not receive a satisfactory response, and the
attorney reasonably believes that a material violation is ongoing (or is about
to occur) and is likely to result in substantial injury to the company or to
investors, the attorney would be required to withdraw from the
representation on the grounds of "professional considerations." Within one
business day, the attorney would be required to give the SEC written notice
of the withdrawal that indicates that the withdrawal was based on
''professional considerations." The attorney would also be required
promptly to disaffirm to the SEC any opinion or other writing that the
attorney had prepared or assisted in preparing and that the attorney
reasonably believes is or may be materially false or misleading.
Noisy withdrawal obligations have also been proposed at the state level.
California experimented with one, but the idea was rejected by the state
supreme court as inconsistent with statutory requirements. 57 The recent
amendments to ABA Model Rule 1.13 also contain a "muted" form of noisy
withdrawal. If an attorney is discharged or withdraws, and the attorney
knows or has reason to know of a legal violation by a person associated
with the client (as more specifically defined in the rule), the attorney "shall
proceed as the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to assure that the
organization's highest authority is informed of the lawyer's discharge or
withdrawal. '58  This provision is muted because the attorney is only
required to make noise internally: She must ensure that the highest
authority in the corporate client is informed, but she need not inform any
external agency.
Noisy withdrawal proposals can make sense, given the legal profession's
evolution from club to competitive organization. For the same reasons as
those pertaining to up-the-ladder reporting, it is important that the noisy
withdrawal provision be mandatory rather than permissive. If the noisy
withdrawal provision is permissive, clients could still seek out law firms
willing to provide assurance that misconduct will not be reported. Two
perverse consequences would follow: Permissive withdrawal would tend to
reward law firms that are willing to assist clients in evading legal
The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1293, 1307-10
(2003).
55. See Adopting Release, supra note 49.
56. See Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, Securities
Act Release No. 8186, Exchange Act Release No. 47,282, Investment Company Act Release
No. 25,920, 68 Fed. Reg. 6324 (Feb. 6, 2003), available at www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/33-
8186.htm.
57. See John W. Amberg & Jon L. Rewinski, Ethics Roundup: Issues of Loyalty and
Confidentiality Continue to Dominate Developments in Legal Ethics, L.A. Law., Apr. 2003,
at 31.
58. Model Rules of Prof'i Conduct R. 1.13(e).
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compliance or engaging in arguable breaches of fiduciary duty, and would
also reduce rather than increase the constraints on the conduct of the very
parties whose behavior we wish to control-risk-preferring managers who
want to test the limits of the law. Under competitive organization, some
law firms will be compelled to assist clients in questionable behavior,
because clients have sufficient bargaining leverage to pressure them to do
so. Thus, in light of the competitive pressures under which attorneys
operate today, noisy withdrawal rules should be mandatory.
The question remains whether such rules should be implemented at all.
Although noisy withdrawal is debated today as something new, it is only a
variation of ordinary withdrawal, an option that has always been available,
and sometimes required, when attorneys cannot resolve tensions between
client loyalty and the obligations incident to being an officer of the court.
Ordinary (as opposed to noisy) withdrawal is an important structural
element of the existing rules of professional responsibility. Withdrawal is
permitted or required in many circumstances. 59 Most importantly for
present purposes, it is the traditional solution for cases in which the client
demands that the attorney pursue a course of conduct which the attorney
considers to be illegal or unwise.60
While the legal consequences of ordinary withdrawal are only that the
attorney no longer represents the client, it has other effects. Withdrawal is
expensive for both the attorney and the client: The attorney loses a
profitable source of billings, and the client loses an attorney familiar with
the client's affairs. Withdrawal also conveys a signal to third parties. That
an attorney no longer represents a client is not easily hidden. People who
know of the withdrawal will draw inferences about the reasons for the split.
The law firm and the client may agree to a bland explanation and might
adhere to that agreement. Even if third parties cannot ascertain the reason
for the split, however, they are likely to conclude that the event itself does
not speak well for either party. A split between an attorney and a
significant client is often the subject of gossip. Moreover, some
information about the disassociation is likely to come out. Whichever party
considers itself to be in the "right" is particularly likely to disclose reasons
for the breakup in order to deflect adverse public perceptions onto the other
party. If the attorney has been fired for incompetence or questionable
billing practices, for example, the client is likely to make that fact known.
Similarly, although attorneys must take care to avoid disclosing privileged
information, they may find ways to suggest that the severing of relations
was due to some fault in the client. Thus, when an attorney withdraws
59. See Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 1.16 (2002).
60. See id. R. 1.16(a)(1) (requiring withdrawal when "the representation will result in
violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law"); id. R. 1.16(b)(2) (permitting
withdrawal when "the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services
that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent"); id. R. 1. 16(b)(4) (permitting
withdrawal when "the client insists upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or
with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement").
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because a client insists on actions that are close to or over what the attorney
considers the line of permissible behavior, that fact may become generally
known or believed. The reputational damage that both lawyers and clients
suffer after a split makes withdrawal costly for both parties.
The practical effects of withdrawal have changed, however, as the legal
profession has evolved from club to competitive organization. Under the
club system, withdrawal by outside counsel conveyed a particularly
powerful signal to third parties. Because law firms represented clients on a
long-term basis, and because lawyers were connected with client
management on many levels, withdrawal imposed high costs on both
parties. Persons who observed the severing of relationships would know
that something significant had occurred. Moreover, because withdrawal
was uncommon, when it did occur it would be a focus of intense interest.
Under competitive organization, in contrast, the practical consequences
of withdrawal are different. Although withdrawal remains costly for both
parties, it is less burdensome for clients than before, because clients are not
as firmly tied to any particular firm. When the parties do part ways, the
signal to third parties may not be as detrimental to clients. Because clients
and law firms frequently end their relationships under competitive
organization, withdrawal by an attorney will not necessarily provoke
intense interest-it is no longer "news" when an attorney and a client part
ways. For the same reason, a split does not necessarily indicate that
something fundamental has occurred. Many separations between attorney
and client occur for reasons that do not reflect adversely on either party.
Moreover, since competitive organization gives clients bargaining leverage
vis- -vis their attorneys, the severing of relations implies that the impetus
for the change came from the client. On the other hand, if the reason for the
separation came out, and that reason turned out to be that the attorney had
withdrawn rather than been discharged, the adverse inferences about the
client might be stronger: Because attorneys incur a high cost from severing
relations with a client, the fact a split has occurred at the attorney's
insistence may lead an observer to conclude that there is something wrong
with the client. Overall, the signal conveyed by a separation between
attorney and client is less detrimental to the client under competitive
organization than under the club system.
Given this analysis, enhancing the effect of withdrawal appears justified.
The rules of ethics have relied on withdrawal as a counterpoise to the
danger of client overreaching. But if withdrawal has become less of a
sanction as a result of changes in economic organization, then client
malfeasance may become more of a concern. To address the current
problems in corporate representation, the regulatory system could increase
the "sting" of withdrawal for the client. Noisy withdrawal would
accomplish this by magnifying the attorney's withdrawal signal and by
directing this signal to the attention of whoever is in the best position to
sanction the client. Noisy withdrawal, in this sense, can correct the
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reduction in attorney independence caused by the evolution of the legal
profession to club organization.
The propriety of this remedy depends, of course, on how strong the
enhancement of the signal is. The mantra of "professional considerations"
found in the SEC's proposed rule threatens to be a powerful signal indeed.
The words "professional considerations" sound innocuous, but when
contained in a written communiqu6 to the SEC pursuant to section 307 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, they attain magical potency. Because the proposed
rule mandates use of this phrase, professional considerations will not be
cited except in contexts contemplated under the rule. Accordingly, the
SEC's proposal essentially requires a lawyer who practices before the
agency to inform it of probable legal violations by a client. While the SEC
may be left guessing about what those violations might be, there is nothing
to stop the agency from investigating the client to ferret out the problem.
This is "noisy" indeed. Whether the noise is too great in light of the risks is
a question that the regulatory system must address and resolve over the
coming years.
C. Disclosure of Client Confidences
The ABA task force also recently adopted important changes to the rules
on confidentiality. Revised Rule 1.13(c) provides that, if the attorney
fulfills his responsibility of up-the-ladder reporting and the organization's
highest legal authority fails to take appropriate action, and if the lawyer
reasonably believes that the violation is reasonably certain to result in
substantial injury to the organization, then the lawyer may reveal
information relating to the representation to the extent that the lawyer
reasonably believes necessary to prevent substantial injury to the
organization. 61 The information can be revealed even if it would otherwise
be protected under the basic confidentiality provisions of ABA Model Rule
1.6.62
This Essay suggests a reason for concern about this rule. As explained
above, the bar has moved from a club to a competitive system of economic
organization. Because of this, attorneys now have less bargaining power
vis- -vis corporate clients. I argued above that in light of this development,
reforms such as up-the-ladder reporting and noisy withdrawal, to be
effective, must be mandatory. Otherwise they could have the perverse
effect of exacerbating the situation, because managers of firms who wish to
61. Model Rules of Prof I Conduct R. 1.13(c) (2003).
62. New Rule 1.6 permits (but does not require) an attorney to reveal information
relating to the representation of a client to the extent the lawyer reasonably believes it
necessary "to prevent the client from committing a crime or fraud that is reasonably certain
to result in substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another and in
furtherance of which the client has used or is using the lawyer's services" or "to prevent,
mitigate or rectify substantial injury to the financial interests or property of another that is
reasonably certain to result or has resulted from the client's commission of a crime or fraud
in furtherance of which the client has used the lawyer's services." Model Rules of Prof l
Conduct R. 1.6(b) (2003).
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test the limits will deliberately seek out attorneys who will exercise only
minimal control. Similar concerns are present in the context of disclosing
client confidences. If a client's senior management wishes to test the law's
limits, management will want assurances that their lawyers will not disclose
their conduct to the authorities. If the confidentiality rules permit such
disclosures, management at the firms that need to be controlled-i.e.,
individuals with a taste for risk and a well-developed ability to deny
inconvenient facts-will be especially careful to seek out attorneys who
promise not to divulge their confidences. Permissive disclosure can,
ironically, reward attorneys whose independence is low, and such attorneys
can develop a profitable market niche as lawyers who will not "rat out"
client misconduct. Moreover, even reputable law firms may find it hard to
resist the pressures to remain mum. Few law firms would want to take up
the invitation of Rule 1.13 to voluntarily disclose client confidences,
because they would gain a reputation as a firm that cannot be relied on in a
pinch. In short, given competitive organization, permissive disclosure
under Rule 1.13 could do more harm than good. Making such disclosure
mandatory, however, would solve this problem. But the costs of a
mandatory disclosure rule, such as creating distrust and lack of
communication between attorneys and clients, would potentially exceed any
perceived benefits. An analysis of the underlying economic trends in the
industry suggests reasons for concern about the utility of Model Rule 1.13
insofar as it allows, but does not require, attorneys to disclose client
misconduct when up-the-ladder reporting has proved ineffective.
D. Changes in Professional Identity
A final potential reform is to influence business lawyers' sense of
professional identity. Such reforms could include, for example, changes in
legal education to stress the value of independence, changes in training
programs for younger attorneys in practice, enhanced emphasis on
professional independence in continuing legal education programs, and
public commitment to the concept of attorney independence by influential
bodies such as the ABA.
Changing the professional self-identity of attorneys is appealing because,
if successful, it is self-policing. If lawyers internalized a particular sense of
identity, it would no longer be crucial to control them from outside. The
control occurs internally, because people experience uncomfortable feelings
when asked to do something that conflicts with their self-concept. 63
Should the organized bar attempt to influence professional identity
formation in order to enhance ethical lawyer action? Efforts to enhance a
sense of the value of independence among corporate lawyers probably
would not hurt, but can only be expected to have a modest impact. Efforts
by the government or other organized interests to change professional
63. For an extended discussion of the role of identity as a form of social control, see
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal Function of Ritual, 80 Chi.-Kent. L. Rev. 1181 (2005).
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identities are not always successful. Indeed, the organized bar has already
attempted the exercise. After the Watergate scandal, the ABA required that
law schools provide instruction in the history and norms of the legal
profession. The purposes of this reform were to promote more ethical
conduct among attorneys and to counteract the negative public image of
attorneys that the scandal had triggered. It is not clear that the reform had
any lasting effect on lawyer behavior beyond forcing thousands of law
students to take upper-level mandatory courses in legal ethics, thus giving
many of them a decidedly negative view of the whole subject. It is likely
that all of the attorneys involved in the most recent spate of corporate
scandals were instructed in legal ethics and passed the professional
responsibility section of the bar examination. This and other examples
suggest the need for caution about what can be accomplished when the
government or organized bar seeks to shape professional identities.
At the same time, altering professional identities may already have been
accomplished in part by Enron and other corporate scandals. These
scandals may result in devastating liabilities for law firms. Some firms
associated with the scandals have already suffered losses of clients and
defections of partners and associates. The mistakes that may have been
made by attorneys in these cases stand as object lessons for all lawyers in
business law practice-lessons that probably will do more to shape
behaviors than any number of hours of continuing legal education. At the
same time, clients also have learned from the recent fiascos. It is unlikely
that attorneys and other professionals will face the sorts of pressures to
manage financial statements or cover up questionable conduct that they
faced during the bubble economy years. While these lessons cannot be
expected to last forever, they at least promise to operate, for a substantial
period of time, as inoculations against behavior that tacks too close to the
wind. Circumstances have already accomplished much of the work.
CONCLUSION
This Essay argues that corporate lawyers do not always engage in value
creation when they represent clients in compliance matters or in decisions
implicating the fiduciary duties of management. The traditional protection
against socially undesirable representation was the attorney's independence
from the client, backed by the threat of withdrawal. That protection,
however, has eroded as the legal services market evolved from club to
competitive forms of organization. The problems of reduced lawyer
independence have come to the fore because of the corporate scandals
related to the bubble economy-Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and
HealthSouth being prime examples. Although we do not yet know the full
facts in those cases, it is possible that if counsel had exercised a higher
degree of independence, some of the harms might have been mitigated.
This Essay addressed several proposals for reform: up-the-ladder reporting,
noisy withdrawal, enhanced permission to reveal client confidences, and
changes in the self-identity of the profession. Understanding the
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background economic developments provides helpful insights into the
policy arguments for and against these proposed changes.
Notes & Observations
